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Abstract—Data loss incidents, where data of sensitive nature
are exposed to the public, have become too frequent and have
caused damages of millions of dollars to companies and other
organizations. Repeatedly, information leaks occur over the
Internet, and half of the time they are accidental, caused by
user negligence, misconfiguration of software, or inadequate
understanding of an application’s functionality. This paper
presents iLeak, a lightweight, modular system for detecting
inadvertent information leaks. Unlike previous solutions, iLeak
builds on components already present in modern computers.
In particular, we employ system tracing facilities and data
indexing services, and combine them in a novel way to detect
data leaks. Our design consists of three components: uaudits are
responsible for capturing the information that exits the system,
while Inspectors use the indexing service to identify if the
transmitted data belong to files that contain potentially sensitive
information. The Trail Gateway handles the communication and
synchronization of uaudits and Inspectors. We implemented
iLeak on Mac OS X using DTrace and the Spotlight indexing
service. Finally, we show that iLeak is indeed lightweight, since
it only incurs 4% overhead on protected applications.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The damages caused to companies and individuals due
to the exposure of sensitive data are estimated to be in
the range of millions of dollars [1]. Generally, data loss is
associated with malicious intent originating from individuals
or organizations that aim to exfiltrate information of some
value (e.g., trade secrets, credit card numbers). However,
in reality, about half of the data breaches reported are
unintentional [2].
In the past, inadvertent information leaks have created
serious commotion in the press, and were the source of
embarrassment for the large companies and government
organizations that suffered them. An employee who in-
stalled file-sharing peer-to-peer (P2P) software on his lap-
top, unknowingly exposed documents containing personal
data belonging to the company’s employees [3]. Another
negligent hospital employee posted sensitive patient data
on the Web [4]. In other cases, users may be unaware
that an otherwise legitimate application is accessing and
transmitting sensitive data. For instance, Facebook may read
a user’s address book to recommend new friends, or to
automatically invite them to join, without the user even being
aware of it [5].
Most research on detecting and preventing information
leaks has focused on applying strict information flow control
(IFC). Sensitive data are labeled and tracked throughout
an application’s execution to detect their illegal propaga-
tion (e.g., their transmission over the network). Approaches
such as Jif [6] and JFlow [7] achieve IFC by introducing
extensions to the Java programming language, while others
enforce it dynamically [8], or propose new operating system
(OS) designs [9]. Fine-grained IFC mechanisms require that
sensitive data are labeled by the user beforehand, but as
the amount of data stored in desktops continuously grows,
locating documents and files containing personal data be-
comes burdensome. Additionally, systems in nowadays are
an amalgamation of different components that interact in
unpredictable ways, and are frequently used in ways that
their designers and developers did not anticipate. As a result
IFC solutions have seen little use in production systems,
and almost none on desktops that are responsible for most
accidental data leaks.
Commercial data loss prevention (DLP) solutions take a
different approach. They monitor network communications
(e.g., email, HTTP, P2P) to identify files or messages that
may contain sensitive data, based on patterns that describe
credit card numbers, financial data, design documents, and
so forth. Commercial DLP solutions are more pragmatic than
strict IFC, but while they often do protect against data loss,
they are costly and have a low benefit-cost ratio for individ-
uals and small businesses. Furthermore, network-based DLP
is not able to operate on encrypted connections, or protect
portable devices such as notebooks when they are connecting
though possibly unsafe networks. To protect against data
loss under these conditions, end-host deployment of DLP is
required, which further increases costs.
On the other hand, modern OSs already provide mecha-
nisms that we could put to use to detect information leaks.
They offer safe and efficient tracing facilities that can be
used for on demand kernel-level debugging, system-wide
performance evaluation, subsystem interaction analysis, and
so on. DTrace [10], SystemTap [11], and LTTng [12] are
indicative examples of such frameworks that are available
on commodity desktop systems. Additionally, most of the
prevailing desktop OSs also support indexing mechanisms
that increase the efficiency of searching user content.
Tools such as Google Desktop [13] and Beagle [14] are
now commonplace on desktops, offering advanced “desktop
search” capabilities using a variety of attributes like file
metadata, semantic information, as well as user preferences.
We present iLeak, a lightweight system for detecting
inadvertent information leaks by combining together dy-
namic tracing and information retrieval (IR) services that
are already available and integrated in commodity OSs. The
key observation behind our work is that such services are
already deployed and widely used in desktop systems (but
for completely different purposes). In brief, iLeak operates
by tracing the inputs to function and system calls that
transmit or encrypt data, and consequently searching for
those inputs in files and locations that contain sensitive data.
By coupling together those two concepts, we demonstrate
that it is possible to offer a lightweight information loss
detection mechanism for desktops as a composable service.
We do not address data loss that occurs due to an
orchestrated attack, or software exploitation by a malicious
entity, even though iLeak could still be useful in certain
cases. Nevertheless, we acknowledge the gravity of such
incidents, like the recent loss of more than 100,000 emails
of high-profile iPad owners [15].
The main contributions of our work are the following:
1) We present iLeak, a lightweight “personal” data loss
detection system that utilizes existing system facilities.
Specifically call tracing and data indexing. To the
extent of our knowledge, we are the first to employ
such mechanisms to detect information leaks.
2) We transparently handle applications that use encryp-
tion (e.g., browsers) and data encoding (e.g., emailers)
through known libraries such as OpenSSL.
3) We propose an extensible, component-based design,
which can be easily implemented on various OS
architectures, and we present our prototype for the
Mac OS X systems.
4) We evaluate iLeak and show that on average it imposes
only 4% overhead to the users.
Note that our approach is orthogonal to security tools
like Cornell’s Spider [16] and SENF from University of
Texas [17], which crawl a collection of files, searching for
data patterns that resemble potentially critical user informa-
tion such as social security numbers (SSNs) and credit card
numbers. We can automatically label the files returned by
such tools as sensitive, and use iLeak to detect potential
information leaks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents our approach to detecting information leaks, namely
iLeak. We describe its architecture and components in Sec-
tion III. We discuss the prototype implementation of iLeak
on Mac OS X in Section IV, and evaluate it in Section V.
Related work is covered in Section VI and conclusions along
with future work are in Section VII.
II. DETECTING INFORMATION LEAKS
iLeak establishes a lightweight detection service for ac-
cidental information leaks by composing together facilities
that are already available and integrated in commodity OSs.
In order for iLeak to be practical, we identify the following
important properties that a detection facility should incorpo-
rate: transparency, flexibility, simplicity, and performance.
iLeak offers a composite detection service without demand-
ing from the user to change its working habits, or run
its software in heavyweight hypervisors [18] and restrictive
sandboxes [19]. The whole detection process is performed
in the background and in parallel with the normal system
operation, without interfering with the user’s tasks (e.g., by
pausing execution and requesting for the authorization of
particular actions).
iLeak tries to infer whether outbound data are sensitive
or not by relying upon a set of files that contain critical
user information. The construction of this set, though it is
of great importance for the effectiveness of a data leakage
detection tool, is orthogonal to iLeak and does not affect our
design choices regarding its internal structure and operation.
In this study, we consider that this pool can be populated
as follows. First, every file that belongs into a list of OS-
dependent application data locations (e.g., “HOME/.*“ files
in Linux, the “HOME/Application Data” folder in Windows,
etc), which frequently contain personal information, is au-
tomatically considered as sensitive and included in our set.
Next, the user can also indicate filesystem places that contain
sensitive documents, or critical information in general, just
by “tagging” them using the extended filesystem attributes
that most OSs support. Finally, automated document charac-
terization tools, such as Cornell’s Spider or SENF, can also
be used to automatically populate the pool with the files they
identify as containing critical data.
Armed with a set of tagged sensitive files and locations,
we distribute a set of “sensors” on the system that utilize
dynamic tracing for intercepting outbound data. This way
we are able to efficiently and effectively decide whether the
exfiltrated information belongs to a sensitive data store, or
not, just by making the appropriate queries to the file in-
dexing service of the OS. iLeak demonstrates the feasibility
of our proposition and establishes a standardization API for
gluing together tracing and information retrieval services.
A. Data Loss Scenarios
Here we discuss possible data loss scenarios that iLeak
could protect against.
1) File Sharing: In nowadays, it is common for house-
holds to have more than one computers, and in particular
portable ones, which are usually connected to each other and
to the Internet via a residential wireless network. Consider
now two home users who want to exchange some data such
as pictures, music, and movies. One enables the file sharing
service on his notebook without setting up a password or
carefully reviewing all the files that he is actually sharing.
Since the two users trust each other, and the network is
not open to everyone, the shared data can be considered
safe. When they finish exchanging files, the user forgets to
disable file sharing. The next day he stops by his favorite
coffee shop and reads his emails using the shop’s public
wireless network. Unfortunately, file sharing is still enabled
and everybody on the same network can access his files.
To make things even worse, the folder that he is sharing
also contains some important financial documents. Anyone
“curious” enough can easily obtain the exposed data.
2) P2P Sharing: Using P2P file sharing software can also
lead to accidental information leaks [20]. Consider a user
that installs a P2P file sharing application on his workstation
at work. He does not want to spent to much time setting it
up, so he quickly accepts the default settings and the license
agreement. What he did not notice is that the application’s
default settings expose his entire documents folder to ev-
eryone using the same P2P network, and encryption is also
used by default. The user unknowingly released important
documents to the public and his company’s DLP system
cannot prevent it because of the end-to-end encryption.
III. ARCHITECTURE
From an architectural perspective, the core part of iLeak
consists of three major components: the uaudits, the Trail
Gateway, and the Inspectors. These components define a
communication framework for existing, and future, facilities
that are available in typical OS installations and can be
utilized for identifying possible exfiltrations of sensitive
information. Figure 1 illustrates the general architecture of
iLeak. The rest of this section describes the essential iLeak
components.
A. uaudits (micro-audits)
uaudits are information tracking components that are
distributed around the system and intercept outbound data.
iLeak is micro-audit agnostic, which means that it can
support various facilities for intercepting system execution,
attaching into points of interest, and “tracking” potential data
leaks into the network. The actual technology that is used
in order to intercept exfiltrated information is not tightly
bounded to iLeak. Similar, but not identical, mechanisms
are abstracted under the uaudit concept, which essentially
defines an interface that each specific uaudit incarnation
should adhere to in order to operate with the rest of the
iLeak infrastructure.
uaudits can reside both in user and kernel space, and can
be application specific or system-wide elements. They can be
viewed as “sensors” that tap either the OS kernel, or specific
applications for monitoring them in a lightweight manner
and intercepting outbound data. The benefits of delegating
the tracking functionality to the uaudits are manifold:
• Extensibility: iLeak is not directly coupled with the
underlying mechanism that is used for tapping. Future
mechanisms, or even custom monitoring facilities can
be attached to iLeak just by adhering to our pre-defined
API. Note that we do not require changes to the tracing
mechanisms in order to integrate them in iLeak. uaudits
operate as modules that can be attached to the core
framework on demand, without any internal (i.e., source
code related) knowledge.
• Performance: There is an abundance of system tracing
and monitoring facilities that are available in commod-
ity OSs, such as SystemTap and DTrace. Though many
of them offer the same, or very similar tracing function-
ality, they do so at different performance prices. By
decoupling iLeak from the underlying system-related
mechanism, we allow the experimentation and explo-
ration of novel alternatives in a “plug-and-test” manner.
Moreover, we rely on a set of small, lightweight (micro)
monitors for tracking sensitive information and there-
fore we avoid the burden of cumbersome, heavyweight
approaches that track the flow of every single bit in the
system.
• Flexibility: The concept of micro-auditing gives iLeak
the ability to utilize multiple, and completely different,
monitoring services on demand for tapping only the
necessary information flows and avoiding the burden
of heavyweight flow tracking mechanisms. Recall that
iLeak offers protection against accidental information
leaks and not leaks of malicious intent. Thus, capturing
and tracing legitimate information flows of sensitive
data inside the OS is sufficient for the needs of iLeak
and at the same time allows us to reduce the monitoring
overhead, by strategically installing small tracing pieces
only in places where needed.
B. Trail Gateway
The Trail Gateway is the core part of iLeak that drives
the detection process and orchestrates system monitoring. In
particular, it is responsible for establishing a communication
framework between the uaudits and the Inspectors, by gath-
ering audit trails from the uaudits and forwarding them to
the appropriate Inspectors.
Every uaudit is isolated and confined by the Trail Gateway
according to its needs. For example, a uaudit that taps spe-
cific OS facilities is isolated into a separate process with the
appropriate privileges for doing so. Similarly, a uaudit that
hooks the network I/O operations of a particular application
(or family of applications) is confined into a different process
with the appropriate privilege level for performing the I/O
monitoring on the software that is attached. Communication
between uaudits and the Trail Gateway is performed using
typical Inter-Process Communication (IPC) mechanisms,
































Figure 1. iLeak Architecture Overview.
After receiving data regarding potential information leaks
from the established IPC channels with the uaudits, the Trail
Gateway forwards the audit trails into the corresponding
Inspector for verifying whether the exfiltrated data were
indeed sensitive or not. Note that the Trail Gateway merely
acts as an operating component and trail dissemination
backbone for the whole detection process, rather than being
a detection module itself. This task is delegated to the
Inspector elements for further facilitating and extending the
modular, flexible, extensible, and portable nature of iLeak.
C. Inspectors
Inspectors are the elements of our architecture that gen-
erate alerts for potential data leaks. They are middleware
components that facilitate the integration of various desktop
search engines into iLeak, by acting as bridges between the
Trail Gateway and the corresponding indexing service.
The Trail Gateway forwards inspection requests to every
Inspector, which are essentially calls for investigating the
normalized audit trails captured by the uaudits. The Inspec-
tor modules formulate a set of appropriate queries for the
indexing service that are associated with, in order to rapidly
locate files that might contain the audit trails in question.
After receiving the result set (i.e., candidate files for alerts),
the Inspector generates an alert for every file that belongs
into the pool of sensitive files. The typical alert contains the
process id and the name of the leaking process, the sensitive
data that have been exposed, as well as the remote network
location that is related to the data loss incident.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
The Trail Gateway makes up the core part of iLeak and
consists of approximately 1500, POSIX-compliant lines of
code (LOC) in C. As we already discussed in Section III-B,
one of its primary responsibilities is to isolate and confine
each uaudit into a separate process, and install an IPC
mechanism for receiving audit trails. In order to perform
this task, it uses a uaudit descriptor that comes along with
every uaudit.
The uaudit descriptor operates as a “driver” for a particu-
lar uaudit and contains the following information for aiding
the Trail Gateway to perform its task:
• invocation parameters. That is, how to invoke a particu-
lar uaudit and attach it into the system, or inject it into a
specific process (i.e., command line parameters, system
and pre-execution options, environmental variables).
• required privileges. This knowledge is exploited by
the Trail Gateway in order to confine every uaudit in
accordance to the principle of least privilege. Since
iLeak handles a large amount of sensitive information,
special consideration is given to the capabilities of the
tapping facilities to reduce the possibility of abuse.
• IPC details. Information regarding the communication
channel between the Trail Gateway and the uaudit. Such
information can be a single file descriptor when named
or unnamed pipes are used, a shared memory identifier
along with the corresponding synchronization facilities
in the case of shared memory, etc.
• audit trail callback. Typically, every uaudit has a
custom and unmanageable way of reporting collected
information (i.e., audit trails in our case). Therefore,
the uaudit descriptors provide a per-uaudit callback
function that acts as a transformation filter between
the uaudit and the Trail Gateway. Raw data that are
collected from the uaudit are passed to that callback
function in order to be parsed and forwarded to the

















Figure 2. iLeak Prototype Implementation.
Initially, iLeak processes all the available uaudit descrip-
tors for initializing and attaching the uaudits into the system.
After the setup phase of the appropriate IPC channels, which
in our prototype are implemented using pipes for simplicity,
the Trail Gateway starts receiving audit trails from all the
active uaudits simultaneously using multiplexed I/O. Upon
the reception of new trails from a uaudit, it invokes the
appropriate callback processing function of that uaudit for
normalizing the input. All collected trails are converted into
internal data structures by parsing the output of the uaudit
and by invoking the API of the Trail Gateway. By combining
process isolation and input normalization, we are able to
support new uaudit mechanisms seamlessly and without any
modifications at all. We only need a particular descriptor for
a new uaudit and a callback function.
Figure 2 depicts our implementation prototype. As
we already mentioned, the core part of iLeak is OS-
independent and POSIX-compliant. However, for evaluating
our prototype we have also implemented a set of OS-
specific uaudit back-ends and Inspectors. Our uaudit mod-
ules make use of the DTrace instrumentation framework
(discussed in Section IV-A) and consist of about 3500
LOC in D (i.e., the DTrace-specific language). In partic-
ular, our two D-scripts, namely syscall_write.d and
syscall_send.d monitor various system calls by strate-
gically attaching a small snippet of dynamic analysis code
into the OS kernel. Initially, every socket and accept
system call is recorded and the returned descriptors (of
PF_INET and PF_INET6 protocol family requests) are
added into a set of monitored descriptors1. Every time a
write, writev, send, sendto, sendmsg, sendfile,
etc, system call is invoked with a file descriptor that was
previously inserted into the monitoring set, the contents of
1We also add into this set every duplicate of a monitored descriptor that
is returned from the dup/dup2 system calls. Additionally, in case of a
fork call, the set of monitored descriptors is inherited from the parent
process.
the user-provided buffer(s) are fed into the Trail Gateway.
Note that the output of DTrace is converted into a normalized
form by invoking the appropriate callback functions.
The whole operation of iLeak is event-driven. More
specifically, every time a uaudit captures information of
interest, it forwards them into the Trail Gateway (via their
established IPC channel). After the necessary input nor-
malization, the Trail Gateway invokes the corresponding
Inspector for verifying if a candidate trail is indeed sensitive
information that is leaked into the network or not.
For the Inspector part of our prototype, we utilized Spot-
light [21]. Spotlight is a system-wide desktop search engine
integrated into Mac OS X, which offers a unified and robust
searching service for documents, applications, e-mails, and
so forth. To facilitate that, it stores all the metadata and
content index into a database, which is fully integrated with
the filesystem. This database is populated by a set of file type
specific plug-ins, called importers. Along with the graphi-
cal interface, the Spotlight search service is also available
through the low-level CoreServices framework [22]. The file
abstraction within that framework is the MDItem object
and consists of a number of different attributes, such as the
kMDItemContentType, kMDItemFSCreationDate,
kMDItemKeywords, etc. A Spotlight query is compiled
by a set of search criteria using the MDItem’s attributes.
For example, the following query is for PDF documents that
contain the word “important”, or composed by user “John”:
kMDItemContentType == "com.adobe.pdf" &&
(kMDItemAuthors == "John" ||
kMDItemTextContent == "*important*")
In our case, we are interested into files that contain a set of
keywords (i.e., the normalized audit trails) and also labeled
as “sensitive”. More precisely, whenever the Trail Gateway
forwards data to the Inspector, a query for sensitive files
containing these keywords is executed and the alerts, if any,
are logged.
A. DTrace Background
Tracing is the process of observing the execution of a
program for collecting useful information of diagnostic and
systemic nature. Various techniques have been developed for
supporting this facility throughout the development cycle as
well as after the deployment of a system. Instrumentation
is one such technique that allows someone to augment the
execution of a program with new, user-provided, code that
aids in collecting data for analyzing the behavior of a system.
DTrace is a dynamic instrumentation facility that focuses
on production systems. It allows the instrumentation of both
user-level as well as kernel-level code in a unified and safe
manner, and has absolutely zero performance cost when
disabled. Initially, DTrace was developed for Sun’s Solaris
10 OS [10], but it has been integrated also into Apple’s Mac
OS X/Darwin (since 10.5/9) [23] and FreeBSD (since 7.1)
[24]. Currently, it is already under development on NetBSD
and GNU/Linux [25] (albeit in a more incompatible way).
Since the primary focus of DTrace is production systems,
it was designed around two key properties: (a) zero perfor-
mance cost when disabled and (b) absolute system safety
when enabled. Its dynamic nature allows to be injected
on demand into virtually every place of a running system
without suffering from the performance burden of static “dis-
abled probes”2. User-provided instrumentation code, also
known as analysis code in written in a high-level language,
named D, that is subjected to a set on run-time checks for
guaranteed safety.
D is C-like but it also resembles AWK [26] in terms
of structure. It has support for all ANSI C operators, it
allows access to user- and kernel-level variables, and data
structures. It also offers dynamic user-defined variables,
structs, unions, and associative arrays. The scoping rules of
the language, its intrinsic data types, as well the program
structure are explained in great detail in [27].
The core part of DTrace lies inside the OS kernel and
includes all the necessary facilities for providing an in-
frastructure for dynamic and arbitrary tracing. User-level
processes become DTrace consumers by communicating
with an in-kernel component and enabling instrumentation.
However, the DTrace framework does not perform any
instrumentation of the system. This functionality is provided
by the providers; kernel-level parts, typically loadable mod-
ules, that communicate with the core engine using a well-
defined API. Providers, declare to DTrace the points that it
can potentially instrument, by providing a callback function.
All in all, DTrace provides merely a skeleton for supporting
future instrumentation methodologies. Nonetheless, it comes
with a set of ready-to-use providers that have no observable
overhead when disabled.
2Systems that support static instrumentation typically induce some dis-
abled probes overhead. Dynamic instrumentation allows truly zero cost,
since the probes are dynamically attached and detached on demand, and
hence, they are “absent” when the instrumentation is disabled.
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Figure 3. Duration of the Spotlight queries as a function of the number
of keywords they contain.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
One of the main goals during the design and implemen-
tation of iLeak, was to keep the system as lightweight as
possible. In this section we evaluate the performance of
our prototype implementation. Both the DTrace uaudits and
the Spotlight Inspector introduce performance overheads. It
is important to note here that the uaudits instrumentation
overhead can directly affect the user’s experience, as it
operates inline with the system or library calls. On the other
hand, utilizing the Spotlight search service may not have
an evident impact on the whole performance of the system,
especially in multicore environments.
As far as the auditing part is concerned (DTrace), we
measured the overhead of our D-scripts (see Section IV)
when instrumenting I/O related system calls. More precisely,
we performed a number of large file transfers from the moni-
tored host to another, with and without instrumentation. Both
hosts were connected over a 100Mbps local network and
were idle during the measurements. On average, enabling the
DTrace uaudits introduced an overhead of 4% on the total
duration of the file transfers. The overhead of the uaudits is
low enough to go unnoticed by the end users.
We also evaluated the Inspector component of our pro-
totype. Recall that the inspection component utilizes the
Spotlight desktop search engine. Figure 3 shows the duration
of each query (y axis) for a different number of keywords. As
we can see, the duration of the queries is proportional to the
number of keywords they contain. However, it is important
to note that the time spent for queries with a few number
of keywords (e.g., less than ten) is negligible. This result
indicates that by extracting a small but representative set
of keywords from the auditing data, we can issue a few
hundreds of queries per second.
VI. RELATED WORK
Previous work on information leakage protection uses
information flow tracking (IFT) combined with data labeling.
Confidential data are tagged using user-defined annotations
(labels), and tracked during execution. Checks are intro-
duced into programs to prevent the illegal propagation of
data labeled as sensitive, thus achieving information flow
control (IFC). Jif [6] and JFlow [7] are extensions to the
Java language that statically check information flow using
the label model to deliver IFC. These approaches offer a
more fine grained IFC than iLeak, but require significant
changes to deployed software (i.e., they require manual
annotation of the source code). Trishul [8] also targets
Java programs, but it does so dynamically, by providing a
modified Java virtual machine (VM) that checks information
flow at runtime. Unfortunately, it also requires that the Java
runtime environment is replaced, while it is not able to track
Java native interfaces (JNI).
TaintBochs [19] employs IFT to analyze the lifetime (i.e.,
duration of exposure) of private data such as credit cards,
passwords, etc. It builds on the assumption that as sensitive
data remain in memory, the risk of leaking the data due to a
program error or an attack increases. TaintBochs differs from
iLeak, as it aims to only evaluate the lifetime of critical data
in applications. Furthermore, it is based on the Bochs IA-32
emulator, which causes slowdowns of approximately x100,
making it impractical for production systems.
HiStar [9] also uses labels to provide IFC for sensitive
data. It is a new OS design based on Asbestos [28], which
provides the labeling mechanisms. Its main focus is to
protect the system from components that start exhibiting
malicous behavior after being compromised. HiStar suffers
from the same problems as other labeling systems (i.e., the
user must do the labeling). Furthermore, it presents a new OS
design that cannot be effortlessly applied to current systems.
In [29], Carbalho et al. attempt to identify accidental
information leaks over email. Data mining techniques are
used to create a model that correlates content with recipients.
Emails that fail to be classified by the generated model
are treated as potential information leaks, and the user is
warned. The authors also attempt to exploit social network
information to enrich their model and increase accuracy. In
later work, they also developed a plugin that implements
their model, for a popular email client [30]. iLeak is a more
generic solution, since it is able to scan all outbound data
to detect leaks.
Popular email servers, like Microsoft’s Exchange Server
2010, also offer protection from information leaks [31].
Emails are scanned for certain text patterns, and rejected
when addressed to external recipients (i.e., outsiders). Emails
can be also scanned for sensitive data such as credit card and
social security numbers. Such software is similar to iLeak,
but it is only able to handle emails transmitted through the
server. For instance, it is not able to filter emails that are
sent through a cloud service like GMail for businesses [32].
Other work observes that information will always leak in
unpredictable ways, and that it is hard to determine which
information is sensitive.
Instead of trying to eliminate information leaks, it focuses
on quantifying the amount of data being exposed. Backes et
al. [33] present such an approach that uses information flow
analysis to offer a useful quantification of the data being
leaked. Similarly, Borders et al. [34] attempt to quantify
and limit the amount of data that are leaked through HTTP.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We described iLeak, a lightweight personal data loss
detection system that protects users from inadvertent in-
formation leaks. Unlike other approaches, iLeak utilizes
mechanisms already available in commodity OSs, combining
them in a novel way to detect leaks of potentially sensitive
data like corporate documents, credit cards numbers, SSNs,
etc. Our design utilizes tracing facilities like DTrace and
data indexing services such as Spotlight to detect when po-
tentially sensitive information is exfiltrated. We implemented
a prototype of iLeak on Mac OS X, and show that it has
a negligible performance impact. Furthermore, by adopting
a modular design, iLeak can be easily ported to other OS
architectures such as Windows and Linux, which support
different tracing and indexing facilities.
Though our results indicate that it is feasible to offer a
composable data loss detection service using components
already present in modern OSs, additional research is nec-
essary in order to complete this study. More specifically,
in section V we showed that the overhead of a query to the
indexing service is negligible when the number of keywords
is relatively small. Hence, additional experimentation is
necessary in order to investigate how to automatically extract
small, but representative, sets of keywords. Moreover, given
that we can issue some hundreds of queries per second, we
need to better estimate how many queries are necessary on
a typical system. Finally, since our detection approach relies
on keywords for representing sensitive information, there is
a chance for false alerts. As part of our future work, we plan
to thoroughly study the false-positive and false-negative rates
of iLeak on production systems.
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